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BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO: 
REVISITING ANALYST TESTIMONY 
AFTER MELENDEZ-DIAZ 
ALEX HERSKOWITZ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico1 presents the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to revisit its controversial holding in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.2 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether a 
defendant’s right to confront his accuser was violated when the state 
introduced the reports of a laboratory analyst, but not the analyst who 
produced them.3 By a 5-4 majority, the Melendez-Diaz Court held that 
because the affidavit was an out-of-court statement intended for trial, 
in other words “testimonial,” the state violated a defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront his accuser by not putting the analyst 
on the stand.4 Bullcoming poses the question left open by Melendez-
Diaz: Does the State still violate the Confrontation Clause if it calls to 
testify an analyst other than the one who actually performed or 
observed the laboratory test at issue?5 Thus, Bullcoming is the Court’s 
most recent case in a jurisprudential line addressing the scope of a 
defendant’s procedural right to confrontation. 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a 
defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”6 Defendants benefit from this right through the exclusion of 
inculpatory evidence absent an opportunity to confront an accusatory 
witness.7 The recent appointment of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to 
 
 2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2010). 
 2. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 3. Id. at 2530. 
 4. Id. at 2532. 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bullcoming, No. 09-10876 (U.S. May 2, 2010). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 7. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements are 
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the Court calls into question not only whether the holding of 
Melendez-Diaz requires a particular analyst at trial, but also its 
continuing viability.8 
II. FACTS 
In the late afternoon of August 14, 2005, Donald Bullcoming was 
arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) after a minor traffic 
accident in which he rear-ended another vehicle.9 The other driver 
suspected that Bullcoming was drunk—while exchanging information 
he had noted Bullcoming’s eyes were bloodshot and he smelled of 
alcohol.10 The other driver’s wife called the police to report the 
accident.11 By the time the police arrived, Bullcoming had left the 
scene.12 
Shortly thereafter, the officer found Bullcoming a short distance 
from the scene and noted that he appeared to be drunk.13 The officer 
then brought Bullcoming back to the scene of the accident, where a 
second officer also observed signs of drunkenness.14 In response to 
police questioning, Bullcoming claimed not to have had a drink since 
6 AM that morning.15 He failed the field sobriety tests, however, and 
the police arrested him for DWI.16 After Bullcoming refused a breath 
test, the police obtained a search warrant to perform a blood alcohol 
test.17 The test indicated that Bullcoming had a blood alcohol content 
of .21 percent, well over the legal limit of. 08 percent.18 
A gas chromatograph machine was used to analyze Bullcoming’s 
blood alcohol content.19 New Mexico provides standard laboratory 
 
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Paul Vinegrad, Two more bottom-side amicus briefs in Bullcoming, THE 
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 1:25 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ 
(commenting on Richard Friedman’s blog post and arguing that the Court may revisit the 
“relatively new ‘testimonial’ approach of Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)]”). 
 9. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010). 
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procedures that analysts must follow when processing blood 
samples.20 The machines produce data that the analysts interpret and 
validate.21 The laboratory also preserves the unused portion of the 
blood sample for six months so it is available for retesting.22 Per 
standard procedure, the analyst who processed Bullcoming’s blood 
sample recorded on the forensic report that he had received the 
specimen with the seal intact, that he had followed the correct 
procedures, and that the statements he recorded were correct.23 
At Bullcoming’s trial for aggravated drunk driving, the State did 
not call the testing analyst to the stand.24 Although the State did not 
claim that particular analyst was unavailable, the State called a 
different analyst from the laboratory—one who did not have any 
connection to Bullcoming’s sample.25 Bullcoming objected to this 
analyst’s testimony as a violation of his confrontation rights.26 He also 
objected to the introduction of the laboratory report as a business 
record.27 Ordinarily, hearsay statements made during the regular 
course of business are admissible at trial and are not subject to the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause.28 Where, however, the 
business conducted specifically is done in anticipation of trial, 
admission without opportunity for cross-examination violates the 
Confrontation Clause.29 The trial court nonetheless admitted both the 
laboratory report and the analyst’s testimony.30 Bullcoming 
subsequently was convicted and sentenced to serve two years in 
prison.31 On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, 
holding that the reports were “prepared routinely with guarantees of 
trustworthiness” and were nontestimonial.32 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 
2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (describing business records as 
nontestimonial). 
 29. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943) (holding that a report made by a 
railroad in anticipation of litigation was not a “business record” for purposes of the hearsay 
rule). 
 30. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d at 684. 
 31. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 6–7. 
 32. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d at 685. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . .”33 Much of the debate surrounding 
this guarantee concerns who is a “witness against” the defendant.34 In 
1980, the Court decided Ohio v. Roberts,35 which replaced the Court’s 
then-existing case-by-case approach with a new Confrontation Clause 
doctrine.36 In Roberts, the Court held that hearsay statements are 
admissible if the defendant was unavailable and the statements 
“b[ore] adequate indicia of reliability.”37 Such “indicia of reliability” 
could be inferred if a statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or showed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”38 
In 2004, Crawford v. Washington39 overruled Roberts and its 
progeny. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, seven members of 
the Court established a new framework for interpreting alleged 
violations of the Confrontation Clause.40 Under Crawford, a “witness 
against” a defendant is one who “bear[s] testimony.”41 The Court 
defined testimony as being “typically a solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”42 While declining to identify all classes of testimonial statements, 
the Crawford Court noted several important examples that 
indisputably would fall into this category, including43: 
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, 
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially . . . extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, or confessions . . . statements that were made 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 34. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (finding it necessary to examine the 
historical background to resolve which of the various plausible theories about who is a “witness 
against” a defendant under the Confrontation Clause is correct). 
 35. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 36. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 567 (2d ed. 2008). 
 37. Id. at 66. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 40. Id. at 43. 
 41. Id. at 51. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 51–52. 
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under circumstances that would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial . . . .44 
After making Confrontation Clause violations contingent on a 
testimonial hearsay statement,45 the Crawford Court permitted “only 
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.”46 Thus, the 
Confrontation Clause had morphed from a substantive reliability rule 
into a procedural guarantee.47 
Following Crawford, the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. 
Washington48 to further define “testimonial” statements.49 Davis 
consolidated two cases involving statements made to police during, or 
immediately after, an emergency.50 In an 8-1 decision, with only Justice 
Thomas dissenting in part, the Davis Court formulated a new 
“primary-purpose” test for determining whether a statement is 
testimonial in situations involving police interrogations.51 Under 
Davis, “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency.”52 
Recently decided Michigan v. Bryant53 addressed a question left 
open by Davis: Is an emergency ongoing if the perpetrator of a violent 
crime may still be in the area?54 In Michigan, the police questioned a 
mortally wounded victim half an hour after he had been shot.55 The 
Court held that the victim’s statements had been made during the 
course of an ongoing emergency and therefore were nontestimonial 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 68 (exempting nontestimonial statements from the Confrontation Clause 
regardless of their reliability). 
 46. Id. at 54 (accepting admissibility of hearsay statements conditioned on “unavailability 
and a prior opportunity to cross-examine”). 
 47. Id. at 67 (“To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability 
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.”). 
 48. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 817. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 822. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2010). 
 54. Id. at 1150. 
 55. Id. 
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under Crawford.56 In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized 
that the “primary purpose” inquiry is an objective one and does not 
seek to determine the “subjective or actual purpose” of the parties 
involved.57 
Melendez-Diaz addressed a separate question concerning the 
admissibility of laboratory certificates of analysis when the testing 
analyst does not appear at trial.58 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
the “analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts 
were ‘witnesses’ for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”59 The 
analysts’ reports therefore clearly were subject to the Confrontation 
Clause under the reasoning of Crawford and Davis.60 The Court stated 
that the reports fell into the “core class of testimonial statements” 
described in Crawford because they “are quite plainly affidavits.”61 
The affidavits were “incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.’”62 They served the same purpose as having a live witness testify.63 
In fact, because the affidavits’ only purpose was for use at trial, under 
Massachusetts law the affidavits unquestionably were testimonial.64 
Although denying that pragmatic effects have constitutional 
relevance, the Court nonetheless vehemently contested the dissenters’ 
assertions that applying the Crawford doctrine to laboratory analysts 
would wreak havoc on an overburdened state prosecution system.65 
The dissent distinguished the analysts in Melendez-Diaz who had 
“witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the 
defendant’s guilt” from the “conventional witness[es]” at issue in 
Crawford and Davis who were witnesses to a crime.66 The dissenters 
feared the majority opinion’s “vast potential to disrupt criminal  
 
 
 
 56. Id. at 1164. 
 57. Id. at 1156. 
 58. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 59. Id. at 2532. 
 60. Id. (stating that “this case involves little more than the application of our holding in 
Crawford v. Washington”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
 63. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2536 (acknowledging that, while other methods may exist for challenging forensic 
reports, the Constitution guarantees only confrontation). 
 66. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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procedures” and argued that Confrontation Clause doctrine was 
becoming “a body of formalistic and wooden rules.”67 
In Bullcoming, the Court will reconcile conflicting state supreme 
court and federal circuit court precedents concerning the admissibility 
of a non-testifying witness’s statement through the in-court testimony 
of a substitute expert witness.68 In addition to New Mexico, two state 
supreme courts69 have held that a forensic analyst’s statement, 
introduced into court by another forensic analyst, does not violate the 
Confrontation Clause.70 Two other state supreme courts71 and two 
federal circuit courts72 have ruled in the opposite direction, holding 
that a surrogate analyst’s testimony does violate a defendant’s 
confrontation rights.73 Though the Court’s decision in Bullcoming may 
represent a slight refinement of a doctrinal issue regarding the 
sufficiency of substitute procedural safeguards, the practical 
implications for law enforcement and defendants could be significant. 
IV. HOLDING 
In State v. Bullcoming,74 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that 
the introduction of the blood alcohol report did not violate 
Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause rights even though the analyst 
 
 67. Id. at 2544. 
 68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 17. 
 69. See Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 715–16 (2009) (holding that substitute forensic 
analyst’s testimony was valid under the Confrontation Clause where that witness was not a 
“mere conduit” for the laboratory report, and that in any event, such error would have been 
harmless); Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 2009), petition for cert. filed (U.S. 
Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-866) (holding that a lab supervisor knowledgeable of laboratory 
procedures may testify in place of a nontestifying forensic analyst employee). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that substitute 
medical examiner is “not permitted on direct examination to recite or otherwise testify about 
the underlying factual findings of the unavailable medical examiner as contained in the autopsy 
report”); State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 451–53 (2009) (holding that the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony of a nontestifying analyst, but that such error was “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
 72. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361–62 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 40 (2008) 
(holding that a testing chemist’s conclusions were testimonial and therefore subject to the 
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that it violated the Confrontation Clause to admit a certificate of nonexistence of 
record through an agent who reviewed the defendant’s file but did not conduct the records 
search). 
 73. Id. 
 74. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 9 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876). 
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who performed the test did not testify at trial.75 The court held that 
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated 
because another laboratory employee was available for cross-
examination.76 
To assess whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause took 
place, the New Mexico Supreme Court first examined the question of 
whether the report at issue was testimonial.77 Under the State’s theory, 
Melendez-Diaz was limited to Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion 
because it reflected the narrowest grounds of agreement for a 
majority of the Court.78 Justice Thomas concurred in Melendez-Diaz 
only because the “reports in question were ‘plainly affidavits,’ and 
thus were clearly ‘formalized testimonial materials’ governed by the 
Confrontation Clause.”79 The State claimed that because the 
certificate at issue in Bullcoming was not a sworn affidavit—the 
sticking point for Justice Thomas—there was no Confrontation Clause 
violation.80 The court also noted that under Crawford, “‘the absence of 
oath was not dispositive.’”81 The New Mexico court held these 
arguments unpersuasive, citing the fact that an affidavit is only one 
example of “formalized testimonial materials” and its absence 
therefore is not dispositive.82 The report here, like the certificates in 
Melendez-Diaz, was “‘formalized testimonial material[]’ in that [it 
was] made ‘for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”83 
Thus, the court held that the laboratory report was testimonial, 
but the court did not stop there. The court then considered whether 
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights had nonetheless been 
preserved through the testimony and opportunity to cross-examine a 
laboratory analyst not directly involved in testing the defendant’s 
sample.84 Calling the analyst who performed the test a “mere 
 
 75. Id. at 14. 
 76. Id. at 9. 
 77. Id. at 6–9. 
 78. Id. at 8. In Marks v. United States, the Court issued guidance on interpreting plurality 
opinions by stating that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 79. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009)). 
 84. Id. at 8–9. 
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scrivener” and labeling the gas chromatograph machine as the 
defendant’s “true accuser[,]” the court held that the “live, in-court 
testimony of a separate qualified analyst [was] sufficient to fulfill [the] 
defendant’s right to confrontation.”85 Under the court’s reasoning, 
because the analysis of the sample required neither interpretation nor 
independent judgment, the test results essentially were the equivalent 
of raw data.86 The court therefore deemed the testimony of the non-
testing analyst a sufficient safeguard of the Confrontation Clause’s 
protections.87 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Bullcoming’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments 
Petitioner Bullcoming argues that the Confrontation Clause 
encompasses a defendant’s right to confront the “particular witness” 
that is the source of an inculpatory testimonial statement.88 
Bullcoming finds support for this constitutional requirement—which 
he calls the “particular-witness rule”—in the text, purpose, and 
jurisprudential history of the Confrontation Clause.89 Thus, the State 
may not carve out an exception to this rule by substituting, for 
example, one laboratory analyst for another, at trial.90 
 1. The Particular-Witness Rule 
Bullcoming argues that the Framers’ use of the definite article—
”the”—in the Sixth Amendment’s right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses,” read in conjunction with Crawford’s similar use of the 
definite article in expounding the exclusionary rule, is a clear 
indication that the witness in question is “the particular creator of 
that evidence.”91 Similarly, in Melendez-Diaz—”‘[t]he analysts who 
swore the affidavits provided testimony against Melendez-Diaz, and 
they are therefore subject to confrontation’”—indicates that the  
 
 
 85. Id. at 9. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 13. 
 89. Id. at 10–22. 
 90. Id at 14. 
 91. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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Court was referring to the same analyst providing the forensic 
report.92 
The particular-witness rule is necessary to serve the four purposes 
of confrontation previously identified by the Court: cross-
examination, testifying under oath, observation by a jury, and 
“‘physical presence’” of the witness.93 These aspects are thwarted 
when the State refuses to provide the particular witness whose 
testimony is at issue, but instead relies on a surrogate witness.94 
Invoking Wigmore’s adage that cross-examination is the “‘greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’” Bullcoming 
contends that its functions are undermined by surrogate testimony 
because personal knowledge, confrontation under oath, and the jury’s 
ability to observe the accuser’s demeanor are all missing.95 
 2. No Exceptions to the Particular-Witness Rule 
Bullcoming contends that the New Mexico Supreme Court erred 
in creating an exception to the particular-witness rule.96 The New 
Mexico court’s exception was based on its characterization of the 
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the surrogate analyst as 
meaningful.97 Where testimonial statements made by an out-of-court 
declarant are at issue, however, the Confrontation Clause allows no 
exceptions to this rule.98 The Confrontation Clause does not permit 
surrogate witnesses because even if a surrogate witness might satisfy a 
defendant’s cross-examination rights, this still would not address the 
other three aspects of confrontation—oath, observation, and “physical 
presence.”99 Underscoring the importance of these aspects of 
confrontation is Crawford’s directive that “[t]he text of the Sixth 
Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the 
confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.”100 A litany 
of “good sense” reasons to preclude a forensic-evidence exception to 
 
 92. Id. at 27 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 n.6 (2009)). 
 93. Id. at 15. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 16. 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. Id. at 23. 
 98. Id. at 25 (“If a ‘particular guarantee’ of the Sixth Amendment is violated, no substitute 
procedure can cure the violation . . . .”). 
 99. Id. at 23–24. 
 100. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)) (quotation marks omitted). 
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the particular-witness rule also indicates why surrogate witnesses do 
not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.101 Particularly compelling 
reasons include the risk of error, falsification, poor judgment, and 
improper training of forensic analysts.102 
For these reasons, Bullcoming disputes that the Constitution 
allows any exceptions to the particular-witness rule. If the Court 
disagrees, however, an exception would not be warranted under the 
facts of this case.103 The analyst who performed Bullcoming’s test was 
later placed on administrative leave without pay.104 Had that analyst 
testified the State would have been forced to disclose the reasons for 
this disciplinary action—reasons that may have cast doubt on his 
credibility as a witness.105 As Justice Scalia noted during oral 
arguments, “boy, it smells bad to me.”106 
Bullcoming also rejects the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
rationale that the analyst who conducted the test was a “mere 
scrivener,” making the testimony of the surrogate witness a sufficient 
protection of his confrontation rights.107 The Confrontation Clause is a 
procedural guarantee; it applies even if the analyst was nothing more 
than a transcriptionist.108 In this case, however, that the declarations in 
the analyst’s forensic report went far beyond mere transcriptions.109 
B. New Mexico’s (Respondent’s) Argument 
Respondent New Mexico vigorously disputes the New Mexico 
Supreme Court’s concession that the analyst’s report in Bullcoming is 
testimonial.110 Justice Thomas’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz constrained 
the type of statements that could be considered testimonial to 
extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.”111 As a contemporaneous, unsworn, non-adversarial 
 
 101. Id. at 28–31. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 26. 
 104. Id. at 31. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. 
Mar. 2, 2010). 
 107. Id. at 35–36. 
 108. Id. at 36. 
 109. Id. at 36–37. 
 110. Brief for Respondent at 7, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. Jan. 10, 
2011). 
 111. Id. at 12. 
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public record it is not “formalized testimonial materials” that would 
violate the Confrontation Clause.112 
New Mexico also distinguishes the Melendez-Diaz affidavit from 
the report in Bullcoming because of the “inquisitorial” nature of the 
former.113 The Confrontation Clause was a response to the “common-
law abuse of admitting at trial statements made to magistrates during 
pre-trial ex parte examinations.”114 By focusing on the development of 
the Clause as a response to these abusive investigatory procedures,” 
the confrontation right is implicated only when the inquisitorial 
investigation substitutes for the adversarial examination of witnesses 
at trial.”115 
The affidavit in Melendez-Diaz was “inquisitorial” because its 
purpose was to incriminate the defendant, it was prepared at the 
request of a police officer, and the analyst did not swear to the 
affidavit until a week after the laboratory test was performed.116 In 
contrast, New Mexico characterizes the statement at issue in 
Bullcoming as a non-inquisitorial public record because it 
“contain[ed] routine scientific observations by public officials who are 
independent of law enforcement, even if they are made at the arm’s 
length request of a police officer.”117 
New Mexico invites the Court to overrule the Davis primary-
purpose test as “unworkable, flawed, and overly broad in relation to 
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.”118 Limiting the protections 
of the Confrontation Clause to “inquisitorial abuses” aligns most 
closely with the Framers’ original intent to protect against 
prosecutorial abuse.119 Under this view, noncustodial police 
investigations—whether or not they are conducted during the course 
of an emergency—are non-adversarial and therefore would not be 
subject to the exclusionary rule.120 Likewise, “scientific analysis is not 
an interrogation and does not present a danger of prosecutorial 
abuse.”121 
 
 112. Id. at 13–14. 
 113. Id. at 27–28. 
 114. Id. at 24. 
 115. Id. at 25. 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 41. 
 119. Id. at 37, 41–42. 
 120. Id. at 39. 
 121. Id. at 35. 
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New Mexico proposes that the Court should adopt a rule first 
announced in United States v. Inadi.122 Under this rule, testimonial 
statements would be narrowly defined as those statements made to 
prosecutorial or judicial authorities that lack any “independent 
evidentiary significance.”123 A testimonial statement would have no 
“independent evidentiary significance” if that statement could be 
“replicated by in-court testimony.”124 This proposed rule best responds 
to the Framers’ concerns.125 
Even if the Court determines that the laboratory report at issue in 
Bullcoming is testimonial, New Mexico argues that Bullcoming’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were protected by the opportunity to retest the 
sample.126 Retesting the sample would serve the same purposes as 
cross-examination by testing the laboratory analyst’s recollection, 
veracity, skill, ambiguity of result and any possible transcription 
error.127 Thus, if there was an error, it was harmless.128 
VI. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Bullcoming presents an opportunity for the Court to modify its 
approach to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with regard to 
forensic evidence.129 Since Melendez-Diaz was decided (by a 5-4 vote), 
two members of the majority—Justices Souter and Stevens—have left 
the Court. Thus, if either Justices Sotomayor or Kagan aligns with the 
Melendez-Diaz minority that precedent could be overturned or 
significantly narrowed. During her confirmation hearing, then-
Solicitor General Elena Kagan openly discussed her concerns about 
the practical effects of the Court’s opinions, specifically citing the 
impact of Melendez-Diaz on the criminal justice system.130 Justice 
Sotomayor, as a former prosecutor and trial judge, may also be 
sympathetic to the concerns of state prosecutors and law 
enforcement.131 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor’s record as an 
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appellate judge indicates that she could be more attuned to pragmatic 
rather than doctrinal concerns.132 
The remaining members of the Melendez-Diaz majority—Justices 
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas—likely will stay intact as Bullcoming 
appears to be a logical extension of their holding. Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg almost certainly will find Bullcoming, like Melendez-Diaz, 
to be “a rather straightforward application of Crawford.”133 Justice 
Thomas likely will conclude that Bullcoming retains the requisite 
level of formality for a testimonial statement.134 
If a majority of the Justices choose to affirm the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, it is unclear how they would distinguish Melendez-
Diaz. First, New Mexico’s position that Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
constrains the holding in Melendez-Diaz is undermined by the 
majority’s opinion in that case. That opinion “flatly reject[s]” the 
notion that analysts are not “accusatory” witnesses.135 Moreover, the 
“wholesale dismissal of the fundamental underpinnings of the dictum 
portion of the majority’s opinion necessarily would require a rejection 
of the holding in Crawford.”136 
Second, the Court is unlikely to give much weight to the argument 
that both scientific data and the conclusions drawn from it are 
nontestimonial. In their amicus brief, some of the States’ argue that 
scientific data or observations “are merely a premise of [scientific 
conclusions]” because “when considered in isolation” conclusions lack 
significance.137 This argument is unlikely to persuade the Melendez-
Diaz majority because, as Professor Richard Friedman of the 
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University of Michigan notes, “[d]ata and observations are not 
testimonial . . . [but] a report of them is, if made in anticipation of 
prosecutorial use.”138 
Notably, during oral arguments, Justice Scalia, in response to the 
New Mexico Attorney General’s attempt to distinguish the report in 
Bullcoming from Melendez-Diaz, quipped that the Bullcoming report 
“was prepared just for fun, not for use in trial?”139 Justice Sotomayor 
also contested the Attorney General’s “mere scrivener” theory that 
the New Mexico court had adopted.140 Sotomayor noted that the 
analyst was not “simply looking at a number and putting it on a 
report[,]” but was also certifying a number of other things like the 
condition the sample was received in and that standard procedures 
were followed.141 Moreover, citing Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court conceded that “the blood alcohol report was 
testimonial”142 and the Supreme Court’s question presented implicitly 
presumes that the report is testimonial.143 
Third, the Court’s recent decision in Bryant demonstrates that the 
Davis primary-purpose test is alive and well.144 The Bryant decision 
clarified much of the ambiguity complained of by New Mexico.145 
Under Bryant, the “primary purpose of an interrogation” is based on 
“[a]n objective analysis” of the surrounding circumstances.146 The 
Court therefore will inquire into “the purpose that reasonable 
participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ 
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statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter 
occurred.”147 
Attorney General King tried to apply Davis’s primary-purpose 
rule to the analyst’s report in Bullcoming.148 In so doing, he focused on 
whether an interrogation was taking place, and, if so, the statements 
would be regarded as testimonial.149 In Bullcoming, because there was 
no interrogation, Attorney General King argued that the reports are 
nontestimonial. Justice Scalia responded, however, that whether an 
interrogation occurs “doesn’t make any difference. That is not the 
condition for the application of the . . . Confrontation Clause.”150 The 
reports in Bullcoming were prepared for trial. Given Justice Scalia’s 
comments the Court is likely to hold that the analyst’s report is 
testimonial under Davis. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer 
almost certainly will reject Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause 
challenge. They dissented in Melendez-Diaz and could adopt the 
reasoning in that dissenting opinion to conclude that analysts are not 
traditional witnesses with personal knowledge of events.151 At oral 
argument, questions from Justice Alito reflected reasoning that would 
support his holding that laboratory reports are nontestimonial under 
Crawford. For example, Justice Alito emphasized that the testimonial 
information in the analyst’s report could be established by indirect 
evidence.152 Justice Alito also asked Attorney General King whether 
there was any way the police could influence promotions at the 
laboratory.153 This line of questioning could be an attempt to justify 
holding that the analyst report in Bullcoming is nontestimonial—first, 
because the report is not meant to serve as a substitute for live 
testimony and second, because the laboratory employees are 
independent of the police. 
The practical implications of ruling in favor of Bullcoming also 
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counsel against extending Melendez-Diaz. Notably, the States have 
objected to the additional burdens that Melendez-Diaz has imposed 
on already overburdened and underfunded prosecutorial systems that 
require forensic laboratory analysts to testify at trial.154 As Justices 
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas appear inclined to maintain the views 
they expressed in Melendez-Diaz, the outcome in Bullcoming rests 
largely on the votes of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan—both of whom 
can be expected to give substantial weight to the states’ practical 
concerns.155 
The Bullcoming Court is more likely to reject or distinguish 
Melendez-Diaz than it is to affirm and extend its holding. The 
Melendez-Diaz decision greatly fractured the Crawford coalition 
while leaving open the question of whether a state may substitute 
analysts at trial. Bullcoming therefore is a prime opportunity for the 
newly constituted Court to refine its Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence and resolve a troubling issue of modern-day criminal 
law. 
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